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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀects of asymmetries in re-election probabilities across par-
ties on public policy and its subsequent propagation to the economy. The struggle be-
tween opposing groups–that disagree on the composition of public consumption–results
in governments being endogenously short-sighted: Systematic under investment in in-
frastructure and overspending on public goods arise, as resources are more valuable
when in power. Because the party enjoying an electoral advantage is relatively less
short-sighted, it devotes a larger proportion of government revenues to productive pub-
lic investment. Political turnover, together with asymmetric policy choices, induces
economic ﬂuctuations in an otherwise deterministic environment. I characterize the
long-run distribution of capital and show that output increases on average with politi-
cal advantage, despite the fact that the size of the government expands as a percentage
of GDP. Volatility, on the other hand, is non-monotonic in political power and is an
additional source of ineﬃciency.
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11 Introduction
A central issue in dynamic political economy is to understand how political frictions af-
fect ﬁscal policy and economic performance over time. The recent literature has focused
almost exclusively on characterizing symmetric equilibria in which parties behave identi-
cally. A main result is that re-election uncertainty introduces a wedge in intertemporal
decisions when governments lack commitment. This wedge distorts economic allocations;
thereby reducing long-run output and consumption. This paper contributes to the literature
by considering the implications of asymmetries in election probabilities between competing
parties. Additional distortions emerge when incumbents face diﬀerent re-election prospects,
since the politically disadvantaged party leans toward more short-sighted policies. Alter-
nating power induces economic ﬂuctuations via changes in taxation and spending (in an
environment that is otherwise deterministic), furthering the ineﬃciencies. I ﬁnd that the
resulting volatilities are non-monotonic in the size of the political bias.
Persistent partisan advantage in democratic elections has been extensively documented
by political scientists, in particular regarding the voting behavior across US states. Using a
multi-component index that combines historical results in gubernatorial, House, and Senate
elections, individual states are characterized being under Democratic or Republican control.
Brown and Bruce (2008) use a combination of the two most common indices of political
competition, the Ranney index and the Holbrook Van Dunk index, to compute trends
in political advantage. Their study shows that between 1968 and 2003, Massachusetts,
Maryland, and New York exhibit a sizeable and uninterrupted Democratic advantage (both
at the state and national levels). New Hampshire, Wyoming, and Indiana, on the other
hand, have been exclusively under Republican control. Using the index in Diermeier, Keane,
and Merlo (2005) I document that the Democratic party has shown an average advantage
during the period 1929 - 2006 at the national level. Evidence of systematic electoral biases
in other countries is further illustrated by the recent experiences of Japan and Mexico.
Despite the body of research showing that party advantage is fairly common and empirically
relevant, the possibility of asymmetries in election prospects have been ignored in dynamic
political economy models. Understanding its implications is a main objective of this work.
Building on the work of Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Besley and Coate (1998), I
present a theoretical model in which partisan electoral advantage is explicitly considered.
There are two groups of citizens in the economy that disagree on the provision of local
public goods but have common interests regarding the accumulation of public capital, which
enhances output. Groups are represented by parties that alternate in power via a democratic
process. A key feature is that a representative of only one of the groups is in power at
each point in time and suﬀers from limited commitment. I characterize time-consistent
policies as Markov-perfect equilibria. Because election outcomes are uncertain, parties are
endogenously short-sighted—at least more so than the groups they represent. Thus, despite
the fact that ﬁnancing instruments are non-distortionary (i.e., taxes are lump-sum), an
intertemporal wedge arises. Policymakers tend to overspend in public consumption and
underinvest on productive public capital, which reduces output and private consumption.
2The asymmetry arises because one of the parties is assumed to enjoy persistent politi-
cal advantage, which is formalized as a higher probability of winning an election. Because
the two decision-makers have diﬀerent de facto discount factors, interesting strategic inter-
actions arise. In particular, the disadvantaged party is endogenously more short-sighted
and thus under-saves (relative to a world in which its rival had the same eﬀective short-
sightedness), while the advantaged party is less short-sighted and thus over-saves (relative
to a world in which its rival had the same eﬀective short-sightedness). Political uncertainty
is propagated throughout the economy via volatility in policies, and economic cycles en-
dogenously arise. This is the case even though there is no source of uncertainty other than
the identity of the policymaker. Welfare is lower relative to the ﬁrst best not only because of
a dynamic ineﬃciency (investment is too low), but also because volatility in macroeconomic
variables (output, employment, and consumption) is introduced.
Increases in political advantage widen the gap between the policies chosen by the two
parties, as well as their probabilities of being elected. Despite the fact that the size of the
government (total expenditures to output) increases with the political bias, long-run average
output rises. The reason is that a larger proportion of revenues is devoted to productive
public investment, on average. I ﬁnd that the size of cycles induced by changes in political
advantage is non-monotonic because it is aﬀected by changes in policy and probabilities
in opposite directions. Economies in which the political advantage is low exhibit rapid
turnover but small ﬂuctuations in policy, as the diﬀerence in investment shares is small.
This happens because both parties have similar election prospects and are thus equally
short-sighted. At the other extreme, when the biases are large, so are the diﬀerences in
policy. But the most popular party is in power more often, and hence, ﬂuctuations are
small. Volatility is largest for intermediate values of the political bias. Using a proxy for
investment shares and electoral advantage for the US during the period 1929-2006, I show
that these two variables tend to comove, providing some support for the theory.
The organization of the paper is as follows. A discussion of the existing literature is
presented next. The benchmark model is described in Section 2. To make the exposition
clear, the analysis is performed under the assumption of exogenous political turnover. The
Markov-perfect equilibrium is deﬁned in Section 3 and characterized in Section 4. Section
5 provides empirical support for some implications of the theory. Micro-foundations for the
diﬀerent election probabilities are presented in Section 6. The environment is extended to
introduce a voting stage in which agents are subject to an ideological bias and, using a hybrid
citizen-candidate and probabilistic voting model, election probabilities are endogenously
derived. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the dynamic eﬃciency of policy
choice in representative democracies. It builds on the work by Besley and Coate (1998) and
Alesina and Tabellini (1990), who present the ﬁrst theories of political failure. In Alesina
and Tabellini (1990), parties choose to overspend on public goods and to create an excessive
level of debt when the outcome of elections is uncertain. In Besley and Coate (1998) parties
3fail to undertake a public investment that is potentially Pareto improving due to a lack of
commitment in a two-period model. My work extends some of their insights to a dynamic
inﬁnite-horizon political economy model, particularly relevant for assessing the long-run
eﬀects of current policy.
Amador (2008) and Azzimonti (2010) also analyze the ineﬃciencies generated by a com-
mon pool problem but in a fully dynamic inﬁnite-horizon model. Their basic mechanism,
like the one in this paper, is based on the trade-oﬀs described in Alesina and Tabellini
(1990). Amador ﬁnds that politicians are too impatient, behaving as hyperbolic consumers,
which results in ineﬃcient overspending and excessive deﬁcit creation.1 In Azzimonti, over-
spending results in equilibrium due to political turnover but in an environment in which
the government distorts private investment in order to ﬁnance group-speciﬁc public goods.
Neither considers public investment. Battaglini and Coate (2007) introduce durable public
goods ﬁnanced by the government. Instead of focusing on political parties, they assume
that policy is decided through legislative bargaining. In their paper, distortions arise due
to the assumption of proportional taxation on labor income, while I assume those away by
focusing on lump-sum taxes. In my paper distortions arise because public capital aﬀects
the productivity of labor, and these are completely independent in Battaglini and Coate’s
setup. 2 These three papers restrict attention to symmetric environments so there are no
ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic variables induced by changes in power. The analysis of par-
tisan cycles in policy and economic allocations generated by political advantage is a main
contribution relative to their work.
This paper also contributes to the literature on ineﬃciencies resulting from the gov-
ernment’s lack of commitment. While existing models of repeated voting ﬁnd strategic
interactions, most of them must rely on numerical methods to characterize the Markov-
perfect equilibrium (e.g. Krusell and Rios-Rull 1999 or Bachman and Bai, 2010). Hassler,
Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2004), on the other hand, ﬁnd analytical solutions in
an overlapping generations setup in which policy is decided by majority voting, but they
assume away political uncertainty. Hassler, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2007) ﬁnd that ex-
penditures on a consumable public good can be ineﬃcient, but in a model in which agents
who live for two periods vote on a redistributive policy. Unlike in their work, governments
devote part of the expenditures to productive investment in my model, which allows me to
analyze the eﬀects of policy on economic development.
I also extend existing work by endogenizing the probabilities of reelection in a dynamic
setup. A key assumption in this paper is that politicians are citizen candidates who do not
have a commitment to platforms. As a result, voters expect the incumbent to maximize the
utility of the group he represents (disregarding the welfare of other groups). This is opposite
1Caballero and Yared (2010), Cuadra and Sapriza (2008), Debortoli and Nunes (2008, 2010), Devereux
and Wen (1998), Kumhof and Yakadina (2007) and Ilzetzki (2011) also analyze environments in which ex-
ogenous political turnover introduces ineﬃciencies in debt accumulation and the level of taxation in Markov-
switching models. See Lagunoﬀ and Bai (2010) for an interesting case in which the probabilities of re-election
are exogenous but depend on the aggregate state of the economy.
2Besley, Ilzetzki, and Persson (2010) study the eﬀects of exogenous political instability on ﬁscal capacity
(a durable public good) in a similar environment.
4to the standard result in probabilistic voting models with commitment to platforms, where
the politician’s maximization problem is equivalent to that of a benevolent planner (see
Sleet and Yeltekin, 2008 or Farhi and Werning, 2008). In a recent paper Battaglini (2010)
considers an environment in which expected ideological biases are persistent and candidates
are oﬃce seekers with commitment to platforms. He ﬁnds that the political equilibrium
exhibits excessive debt creation and overspending. Due to the assumption that there is no
ex ante bias in favor of or against any candidate, the equilibrium is symmetric. Therefore,
there are no ﬂuctuations in debt, taxes, or macroeconomic variables generated by switches
of power (other than those resulting from productivity shocks) which is the focus of this
study.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on ‘partisan cycles’. In contrast to previous
models in this literature (such as Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore, 1994, Persson and Svensson,
1989 or more recently Song, 2010 and Azzimonti and Talbert, 2011), I do not need to
assume exogenous diﬀerences in preferences over the size of public expenditures in order
to generate ﬂuctuations. Parties have the same ex-ante utility over the size of spending on
public goods and on the level of investment. In equilibrium one party may spend more and
invest less just because it loses more often as a result of an ideological disadvantage.
2 The benchmark model
In this section I describe the economic environment and deﬁne a competitive equilibrium
given policy. Conditions satisﬁed by Pareto optimal allocations are presented to be used as
a benchmark when discussing ineﬃciencies arising from political uncertainty in the following
sections.
2.1 Economic environment
Consider an inﬁnite-horizon economy populated by agents of equal measure who live in
one of two regions, A and B. While they have identical income and identical preferences
over private consumption, they disagree on the composition of public expenditures, since
public goods can be region-speciﬁc (e.g. parks, museums, environmental protection, public
television, etc.). The instantaneous utility of agent j in region J is
u(cj,nj) + v(gJ) (1)
where cj denotes the consumption of private goods, nj denotes labor, and gJ is the
level of discretionary spending on local goods in region J. Notice that an agent living
in region A derives no utility from the provision of a good in region B (and vice versa).
In principle there will be disagreement in the population over the desired composition of
public expenditures but not on its size, since both types have the same marginal rate of
substitution between private and public goods. Throughout the text, I will assume that








where ϵ is the elasticity of labor, and preferences over the provision of public goods are
logarithmic
v(gJ) = log(gJ + G).
The constant G is introduced for technical reasons, in order to ensure that utility is bounded
when the public good is not provided to the region, gJ = 0. Agents discount the future at
rate β ∈ (0,1).
There are inﬁnitely many competitive ﬁrms that produce a single consumption good and
hire labor each period so as to maximize proﬁts, which are distributed back to consumers
who own shares of these ﬁrms. Firms have access to a Cobb-Douglas technology
F(Kg,n) = AKθ
gn1−θ,
where n is the aggregate labor supply and Kg is the stock of public capital (i.e., infras-
tructure, public health, education, knowledge produced by the public sector’s R&D and ex-
penditures on national defense or law enforcement). Its level is determined by government
investments and acts as an externality in production. The idea behind this speciﬁcation
is that the better the infrastructure (roads, harbors, sewers, etc.), the more educated the
population and the stronger the protection of property rights, the higher the productivity
of the private sector. We assume that Kg depreciates fully after being used in production.
In equilibrium, workers are paid the wage w and ﬁrms distribute proﬁts
Π = F(Kg,n) − wn
as dividends to individual shareholders.
The government raises revenues via lump-sum taxes τ which are chosen every period,
so private consumption is
cj = wnj + Π − τ.
Taxes are used to ﬁnance the provision of consumable public goods (gA and gB) and
investments in productive public capital (K′
g). The cost of producing g > 0 units of a local
public good is linear x(g) = g+G, with x(0) = 0. This assumption allows us to characterize
the solution analytically, but all results hold as G → 0. Assuming that there is no debt,
the government must balance its budget every period. Its budget constraint is
x(gA) + x(gB) + K′
g = τ,
where primes denote next period variables. The assumption of lump-sum taxes is made
in order to highlight the fact that ineﬃciencies in production may arise due to political
frictions even when the government has access to non-distortionary ﬁnancing instruments.
62.2 Competitive equilibrium given policy
Firms decide how much labor to hire given wages and distribute proﬁts back in the form
of dividends to agents, who own shares of these ﬁrms. Agents choose consumption and
leisure, taking wages and government policy (public spending and investment) as given. A
competitive equilibrium given policy is deﬁned below (I omit the stock of public capital Kg
from all functions to simplify notation).
Denition 2.1 A competitive equilibrium given government policy Υ = {gA,gB,K′
g} is a
set of allocations, {cj(Υ),nj(Υ),Π(Υ)}, prices w(Υ), and taxes τ(Υ) such that:
(i). Agents maximize utility subject to their budget constraint. Agent j’s labor supply
satisﬁes
u1(cj(Υ),nj(Υ))w(Υ) + u2(cj(Υ),nj(Υ)) = 0,
where
cj(Υ) = w(Υ)nj(Υ) + Π(Υ) − τ(Υ).
(ii). Firms maximize proﬁts, so w(Υ) = F2(Kg,n(Υ)) and Π(Υ) = F(Kg,n(Υ))−w(Υ)n(Υ).
(iii). Markets clear n(Υ) =
∫
j nj(Υ).
(iv). The government budget constraint is satisﬁed.
τ(Υ) = x(gA) + x(gB) + K′
g.
The static nature of ﬁrms’ and workers’ economic decisions simpliﬁes the characteriza-
tion of the competitive equilibrium to a great extent. Moreover, from condition (i) we can
see that agents’ decisions are independent of their type j, which results from the additive
separability of the utility derived from the provision of public goods. Hence, there is aggre-
gation and we can think of the competitive equilibrium as characterized by the decisions of
a representative agent with nj(Υ) = n(Υ) and cj(Υ) = c(Υ).3
Replacing the ﬁrm’s optimal decisions and the government budget constraint into the
agent’s budget constraint we obtain consumption as a function of policy,
c(Υ) = F(Kg,n(Υ)) − x(gA) − x(gB) − K′
g, (2)
with aggregate labor n(Υ) satisfying
u1(c(Υ),n(Υ))F2(Kg,n(Υ)) + u2(c(Υ),n(Υ)) = 0. (3)
3This result holds for any pair of concave functions u(c;n) and v(g), not just the particular ones assumed
in the text.
72.3 Planning solutions
Before describing the outcome under political competition (where diﬀerent parties alternate
in power), it is useful to characterize the optimal allocation chosen by a benevolent social
planner. The planner chooses {c,n,K′
g,gA,gB} so as to maximize a weighted sum of utilities,
where the weight on type J agents is λJ ∈ [0,1] (with λA + λB = 1). The planner’s
maximization problem is
V ∗(Kg) = max
∑
J=A,B
λJ[u(c,n) + v(gJ)] + βV ∗(K′
g),
subject to the resource constraint:
c + x(gA) + x(gB) + K′
g = F(Kg,n).
As long as the planner gives a positive weight to each agent, the optimal allocation of
public good J will be such that its marginal utility is proportional to the marginal utility
of private consumption.4
Departures from this condition represent a wedge ∆g in the optimal provision of gJ
∆g = −u1(c,n)xg(gJ) + λJvg(gJ). (4)
By varying λJ between 0 and 1 it is possible to trace the Pareto frontier that characterizes
the optimal provision of public goods. Concavity of v implies that if type A agents have
a higher weight in the social welfare function, more of their desired public good will be
provided (at the expense of type B agents).
The second optimality condition refers to the optimal labor supply. Under this condition,
the planner equates the marginal disutility of working to the marginal increase in the utility
of consumption generated by additional production. Departures from this equation deﬁne
a labor wedge
∆n = u1(c,n)F2(Kg,n) − u2(c,n). (5)
Finally, the planner chooses the level of public capital that equates the marginal costs
in terms of foregone consumption to the discounted marginal beneﬁts of investment. De-
partures from this condition deﬁne an investment wedge
∆k = −u1(c,n) + βu1(c′,n′)F1(K′
g,n′). (6)
The planner’s Euler equation is completely independent of the choice of the social welfare
function: Changes in λJ do not aﬀect this margin. The result follows from assuming that
both agents have the same trade-oﬀ between private and public consumption (i.e., u and v
are equal for all agents). 5
4If the planner only cares about the well-being of, say, agent A, it will set g
B
t = 08t and g
A
t so as to
equate the marginal rate of substitution between private and public goods to the marginal cost of providing
the goods xg(g).
5It is important to note that the planner is constrained to oﬀer all households the same consumption
allocation (that is, c
A = c
B). This condition is imposed in order to capture the constraint faced by the
government in the political equilibrium (where parties cannot tax agents at diﬀerent rates).
83 Politico-economic equilibrium
The role of the government in this economy is to provide public goods and productive public
capital. Given the disagreement between groups over which public good should be provided,
political parties will endogenously arise in a democratic environment. I analyze a stylized
case in which there are two parties, A and B, representing each group in the population
and competing for oﬃce every period. They alternate in power according to an exogenous
election probability pi, i ∈ {A,B}. The asymmetry arises because one of the groups has
greater political power than the other. In particular, I assume that type-B candidates are
more likely to be elected







and pA = 0.5 − ξ. We can interpret ξ as measuring B’s political advantage.
The elected party chooses the tax rate and the allocation of government resources be-
tween the diﬀerent types of spending and investment so as to maximize the utility of its
own type.6
3.1 Markov-perfect equilibrium
There is no commitment technology, so promises made by any party before elections are
not credible unless they are optimal ex-post. The party in power plays a game against the
opposition taking their policy as given. Alternative realizations of history (deﬁned by the
sequence of policies up to time t) may result in diﬀerent current policies. In principle, this
dynamic game allows for multiple subgame-perfect equilibria that can be constructed using
reputation mechanisms. I will rule out such mechanisms and focus instead on Markov-
perfect equilibria (MPE), deﬁned as a set of strategies that depend only on the current—
payoﬀ relevant—state of the economy. Given the sequence of events the only payoﬀ-relevant
state variable besides the identity of the party in power is the stock of public capital. In a
Markov-perfect equilibrium, policy rules are functions of this state.
The equilibrium objects we are interested in are policy functions, allocations, and value
functions. There are three policy functions: The investment rule of incumbent i, hi(Kg),
and expenditures in each region-speciﬁc good gA
i (Kg) and gB
i (Kg). The labor supply ni(Kg)
and consumption ci(Kg) under incumbent i’s policies summarize the allocations. The value
function of agent type J when his group is in power will be denoted by VJ(Kg) and when
his group is out of power by WJ(Kg).
The incumbent must decide on the optimal policy, knowing that he will be replaced by
a diﬀerent policymaker with probability pi. Suppose that B is the elected party. Given the
stock of public capital Kg, his objective function today is:
6In that sense this is a partisan model. A politician from party j is just like any other agent in that group,
so he wants to maximize his type’s utility. In contrast, other models in the literature assume that politicians
can extract rents from being in power, so their objective is to maximize the probability of winning the next




u(c,n) + v(gB) + β{pBVB(K′
g) + pAWB(K′
g)} (7)
where consumption and labor satisfy equations (2) and (3).
Since gA and gB aﬀect only today’s utility, tomorrow’s decisions are independent of
the composition of expenditures. If party i is in power, it will choose gJ
i = 0, for J ̸= i,
which further simpliﬁes the problem. Slightly abusing notation, we use gi(Kg) to denote
the equilibrium amount spent by incumbent i on the local public good i. The description
of the problem is completed by deﬁning the functions VB(Kg) and WB(Kg):
VB(Kg) = u(cB(Kg),nB(Kg)) + v(gB(Kg)) + β{pBVB(hB(Kg)) + pAWB(hB(Kg))} (8)
and
WB(Kg) = u(cA(Kg),nA(Kg)) + β{pBVB(hA(Kg)) + pAWB(hA(Kg))}, (9)
where Υi(Kg) = {gA
i (Kg),gB
i (Kg),hi(Kg)} denotes the equilibrium policy functions
chosen by incumbent type i, and where ci(Kg) = c(Υi(Kg)) and ni(Kg) = n(Υi(Kg)) are
the competitive equilibrium values of consumption and labor under the political equilibrium
policies.
We can now deﬁne a Markov-perfect equilibrium, which just imposes consistency be-
tween private agents and the government’s decisions.
Denition 3.1 A Markov-perfect equilibrium with exogenous political turnover is a set of
value and policy functions such that:
i. Given the re-election probabilities and CE allocations and prices, the functions hi(Kg),
gB
i (Kg), gA
i (Kg), Vi(Kg), and Wi(Kg)solve incumbent i′s maximization problem, (7),
(8), and (9).
ii. Given the re-election probabilities and government policy, the functions ci(Kg) and
ni(Kg) satisfy equations (2) and (3).
3.2 Diﬀerentiable Markov-perfect equilibrium (DMPE)
In order to further characterize the trade-oﬀs faced by an incumbent when choosing invest-
ment, I will focus on diﬀerentiable policy functions. Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2008)
made this assumption (in a diﬀerent context), arguing that there could be in principle an
inﬁnitely large number of Markov equilibria. By assuming diﬀerentiability, the problem
delivers a solution that is the limit to the ﬁnite-horizon problem. Moreover, it allows us
to derive the government optimality condition even though the envelope theorem doesn’t
hold.
10The choice of expenditures is a static one, aﬀecting only the intratemporal margin. At
the optimum, the government chooses g so that the marginal cost of providing the good in
terms of consumption equals its marginal beneﬁt:
u1(cB(Kg),nB(Kg))xg(g) = vg(g). (10)
We can see that government spending in the MPE is sub-optimal from the standpoint of
a social planner—which gave positive weight to both types—since ∆g ̸= 0 (see eq. 4).
Sub-optimality arises for two reasons. First, the group out of power gets no provision of
their preferred good. Second, there is overspending in the sense that the marginal rate of
private consumption is too low when compared to that of the utilitarian optimum (or any
level associated with positive weights λJ > 0. Even the group in power would prefer a lower
level of g if the diﬀerence was invested in productive capital and subsequently used in the
provision of its preferred good instead.
The investment decision aﬀects the intertemporal margin; the costs of increasing public
capital are paid today, while the beneﬁts are received in the future. The government chooses
K′





As in the planner’s ﬁrst-order condition, the cost of an extra unit of investment in public
capital is given by a reduction in current utility via a decrease in consumption −u1(c,n).
The beneﬁts, on the other hand, now depend on the identity of the party that wins the next
election. When K′
g increases, expected future utility rises from the expansion of resources.




g utils if they win the next election




g otherwise (which occurs with
probability pA = 1 − pB).
The politico-economic equilibrium studied here implies several distortions relative to the
ﬁrst best as shown in Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1 The investment wedge in incumbent B’s ﬁrst-order condition is given by





































Proof See Appendix 8.1.
11If pA = 0, B would remain in oﬃce forever. In such a case, the incumbent would invest
exactly as a benevolent planner and the investment wedge would be zero. This cannot be
interpreted as implying that allocations are equivalent, because gA = 0. Growth implica-
tions are the same (since eﬃciency is achieved), but at the expense of some proportion of
the population enjoying lower utility as one type of public good is never provided.
When pA > 0, there is a positive likelihood (1−pB) that the group in oﬃce loses power
next period, which introduces a wedge in the investment optimality condition. This wedge
is composed of three terms.
The ﬁrst term, DE, captures the cost of disagreement in terms of the provision of
public goods. When the incumbent is not re-elected (which happens with probability pA), a
marginal increase on public capital today changes the opposition’s spending in public goods
tomorrow by gA1(K′
g). This results in a cost in terms of foregone consumption next period
with no utility beneﬁt, since the incumbent derives no utility from that public good. From
today’s perspective it is optimal, then, to decrease investment with respect to the certainty
case: The current incumbent wants to ‘tie the hands’ of its successor in order to restrict
its spending. The disagreement over the composition of public goods, together with the
political uncertainty, deters public investment.7
If parties had the same political power (pA = pB), the composition of expenditures
would be the only source of disagreement. The center of the conﬂict would be what to
spend the budget on, instead of how much to spend (as analyzed in detail in Azzimonti,
2010). All distortions would be summarized by the DE. Under asymmetry, there is also
disagreement on the levels of spending and investment, as seen from the two additional
eﬀects described next.
Because parties’ constituencies diﬀer, the reaction of the opposition to a change in K′
g
will be sub-optimal from the standpoint of party B (since both groups value the future
diﬀerently). The second term, MB, corresponds to the diﬀerence in the marginal beneﬁt
of investment received when tomorrow’s government policy is chosen by the opposition and
the one obtained if party B remained in power.
The last term in the optimality condition, ID, captures the investment disagreement
resulting from the fact that parties would invest diﬀerently if in power. Because B’s like-
lihood of staying in power is larger, the expected marginal beneﬁts of investing one more
dollar in public capital are higher than for party A, which would increase investment next
period only by hAk(K′
g). This distorts future investment costs diﬀerentially for both parties,
introducing an additional distortion.
Since speciﬁc functional forms for utility and production were not used to derive equation
11, this equation describes more generally the optimal behavior of an incumbent in a political
equilibrium with re-election uncertainty.
7This eﬀect is similar to that observed in Persson and Svensson (1989). Besley and Coate (1998) ﬁnd
that disagreements over redistribution policies can result in ineﬃcient levels of investment. Milesi-Ferretti
and Spolaore (1994) also obtain strategic manipulation but for an alternative environment. For an inﬁnite-
horizon economy with symmetric shocks that also exhibits a disagreement eﬀect, see Azzimonti (2010).
124 Characterization
It is instructive to analyze the Pareto optimal allocations ﬁrst, obtained by solving the
planner’s problem presented in Section 2.3. Under the assumptions above, the economy
collapses to a traditional neoclassical economy and thus the standard results apply. There
exists a unique equilibrium in which the labor supply takes a simple form,




and the level of production is given by
F(Kg,n(Kg)) = ¯ AK
 θ
g where ¯ A = A[ϵA(1 − θ)]
ϵ(1−θ)




Public capital evolves according to
K′
g = s∗ ˜ AK
 θ








g equals the total amount of resources net of the disutility of labor, and we can
think of it as ‘labor-adjusted’ production. A benevolent planner invests a constant pro-
portion s∗ = β¯ θ of labor-adjusted resources, independently of the Pareto weights attached
to each group (these weights aﬀect the composition of region-speciﬁc public goods but not
the total amount of resources devoted to them). Since ¯ θ < 1, public capital converges
deterministically to a steady-state level K∗
g = [β¯ θ ˜ A]
1
1− θ.
4.1 Dynamic ineﬃciencies in the MPE
The competitive equilibrium given policy determines consumption and labor as functions
of government spending and investment. Because taxes are lump sum and there are no
income eﬀects under the GHH formulation, the labor supply follows eq. (12). Consumption
satisﬁes
ci(Kg) = ¯ AK
 θ
g − gi(Kg) − G − hi(Kg).
Proposition 4.1 fully characterizes government policy.




(1 − si) ˜ AK
 θ
g − G, hi(Kg) = si ˜ AK
 θ
g, and τi =
1
2
(1 + si) ˜ AK
 θ
g
and the propensity si satisﬁes
si = ¯ θβ
[
1 + pi
2 − ¯ θβ (1 − pi)
]
. (13)
Proof See Appendix 8.2.
13An incumbent of type i invests a constant proportion of labor-adjusted resources, with
the propensity to invest being an increasing function of the probability of reelection. Dif-




2¯ θβ(1 − ¯ θβ)
(2 − ¯ θβ(1 − pi))2 > 0. (14)
The beneﬁts from an extra unit of investment are not fully internalized, which causes the
incumbent to behave myopically and overspend today on unproductive public goods (and
underinvest in public capital). The eﬀect is stronger, the lower the probability of remaining
in power. The next corollary summarizes the distortionary eﬀects of political uncertainty
on government policy.
Corollary 4.1 The Markov-perfect equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient if and only if pi = 1.
When pi < 1 there is underinvestment in public capital si < s∗, so the MPE is ineﬃcient.
Proof Let pi = 1, then si = s∗ from eq. (21). Let pi < 1, then si < s∗ by eq. (14).
The intuition behind this result can be understood by looking at the trade-oﬀs faced
by the group in power. An incumbent who believes that he will be replaced with high
probability does not have strong incentives to abstain from consumption today in order
to invest in public capital. Knowing that it is very likely that tomorrow’s policymaker
would prefer a diﬀerent composition of spending, the incumbent tries to manipulate next
period’s policy through the choice of the state variable. He ties the hands of his successor
by decreasing the amount of available resources (i.e., investing a small amount today),
which shrinks the tax base tomorrow. It is then reasonable to expect the propensity to
invest under political uncertainty to be lower than that chosen by a planner. Finally, note
that while the equilibrium is Pareto optimal when pi = 1, the allocations do not coincide
with those chosen under a utilitarian planner because one of the groups never receives its
preferred public good.
4.2 Ideology-driven economic ﬂuctuations
An interesting feature of this model is that it delivers endogenous cycles in economic vari-
ables generated by parties’ alternation of power. Even though there are no exogenous
productivity shocks, output, investment, consumption, labor, and taxes ﬂuctuate in the
long run.
From the government’s maximization problem, the evolution of public capital follows
K′
g = si ˜ AK
 θ
g (15)
where si ∈ {sA,sB} depends on the identity of the incumbent. Since pB > 0.5, eq. 21
implies
sA < sB.
Consider an economy with 0 < Kg0 < Kss
gA. If party i were in power long enough, capital
would converge to the steady-state value Kss
gi, as shown in the following lemma.




gi = (si ˜ A)
1
1− θ.
Proof Existence is trivial from hi(Kg) = si ˜ AK
 θ
g. Uniqueness follows from the properties
of the policy function: (i) it is strictly increasing, h′
i(Kg) = si ˜ A¯ θK
 θ−1
g > 0 since si ∈ [0,1]
and ¯ θ < 1, (ii) strictly concave h′′
i (Kg) = si(¯ θ − 1) ˜ A¯ θK
 θ−2
g < 0, and (iii) it crosses the 45◦
line from above h′
i(Kss
gi) = ¯ θ < 1.
Suppose that the government always followed B’s optimal investment rule. Then Kg
would evolve according to the upper line in Figure 1, converging eventually to Kss
gB (where
B’s policy function intersects the 45◦ line). If A’s rule was followed instead, not only would
the steady state be lower (Kss
gA < Kss
gB) but convergence would take place at a slower pace.
This follows from the fact that the speed of convergence under B is larger, h′
B(Kg) > h′
A(Kg).
When parties alternate in power, public investment ﬂuctuates following the political cycle






















Figure 1: Evolution of capital: Policy functions
Eventually, the economy reaches an ‘ergodic set’ in which public capital only takes values






. Since public capital aﬀects the productivity of the
private sector, other macroeconomic variables (such as labor, output, and consumption) also
ﬂuctuate, with political shocks propagating into the real economy. The following proposition
formally characterizes the evolution of capital over time.
Proposition 4.2 Let 0 < Kg0 < Kss
gA. Then ∃T < ∞ such that {Kgt}T





15Proof See Appendix 8.3
The proposition states that starting from a value of capital outside of the ergodic set,
the sequence of Kgt is increasing and reaches the set in ﬁnite time. This is illustrated in
Figure 2, which plots a series of investment for a simulation of this economy (the parameters
used in this numerical example are described in detail in Appendix 8.10.1). It also shows
the evolution of capital that would be followed by a benevolent planner. We can see that a
















Figure 2: Evolution of capital: Simulation
Public capital exhibits an increasing trend until it reaches the ergodic set at which point
it ﬂuctuates around a constant mean. It is possible to show theoretically that this process
is in general stationary. In order to do so, it is useful to work with the logarithm of our
variables of interest. Let ˆ x ≡ log(x), we can show:
Lemma 4.2 Deﬁne ¯ ϵ = pAˆ sA + pBˆ sB. Then ˆ Kgt+1 follows an AR(1) process,
ˆ Kgt+1 = q + ¯ θ ˆ Kgt + ϵt
where ϵt = ˆ st−¯ ϵ and q = log( ˜ A)+¯ ϵ. The shocks ϵt are i.i.d and white noise with zero mean
and variance
σ2 = pApB(ˆ sA − ˆ sB)2.
The long-run distribution of ˆ Kgt+1 has the following properties.
16i. The mean is
E( ˆ Kgt+1) =
q
1 − ¯ θ
≡ µ.
ii. The variance is
Var( ˆ Kgt+1) =
σ2
1 − ¯ θ2 ≡ γ0.
iii. The auto-covariances and auto-correlations satisfy
Cov( ˆ Kgt+1, ˆ Kgt+1−j) =
¯ θj




Proof Take logs in equation (15) to obtain ˆ Kgt+1 = log ˜ A + ¯ θ ˆ Kgt + ˆ st. Since ˆ st is a two-
state iid stochastic process that equals ˆ si with probability pi, its expected value is E(ˆ st) =
pAˆ sA + pBˆ sB = ¯ ϵ. By adding and subtracting ¯ ϵ from the equation, its transformed error
term ϵt has a zero mean. The variance is obtained by computing V ar(ϵt) = E(ϵ2
t)−[E(ϵt)]2
and using the fact that pA = 1−pB. Stationarity follows from the fact that ¯ θ < 1. For the
computation of long-run moments, see Hamilton (1994).
Figure 3 depicts the evolution of investment and spending in region-speciﬁc goods for a
period of time, once the economy has reached its ergodic set.













































Investment and spending cycles
Expenditures
Investment
Figure 3: Understanding the cycle
The economy experiences booms when B is in oﬃce and short periods of recession after
party A wins an election. For example, consider what happens after t=7, when group B
17takes oﬃce. There is an immediate jump in investment and a contraction of spending on
public goods. This results in larger levels of public capital and hence more production (i.e.,
a ‘boom’ in the economy). Government investment grows over time (periods 7 to 13), and
as public capital becomes larger, the amount provided of the public good also increases.
Group A gets into power in period 14, at which time expenditures on public goods have
a boost accompanied by a contraction in investment. An empirical implication from this
analysis is that we should observe a jump in public consumption when a party that doesn’t
often win takes power, together with a sudden decrease in investment. Total expenditures
increase when the party with higher political power is in oﬃce, since
eit = x(git) + hi(Kgt) =
1
2
(1 + si) ˜ AK
 θ
gt
rises right after B takes control of the government.
Notice that the nature of the economic cycle is intrinsically diﬀerent from the one found
in traditional partisan cycle models, in which one of the parties is assumed to derive higher
utility from public goods than the other. In such models, switches in power that are asso-
ciated with increases in total expenditures should also result in higher public consumption.
In this model, however, increases in total spending right after a switch in government would
be associated with decreases in public consumption. This implication would allow us to
test the two competing theories using cross-country data (or data for US states).
Because output, consumption, and expenditures are proportional to capital, their pro-
cesses are also stationary. The following lemma provides some insights into the propagation
mechanism of political shocks.
Lemma 4.3
Var(ˆ nt) < Var(ˆ yt) < Var( ˆ Kgt+1) and
Var(ˆ ct) = Var(ˆ x(gt)) > Var(ˆ yt).
Proof See Appendix 8.4.
Switches of power cause policy changes (taxes, spending and investment), which in turn
induce ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic variables in an environment that would otherwise be
deterministic. Private consumption reacts immediately to the change in taxes that occurs
after a political switch. The labor supply, on the other hand, is unaﬀected by the resulting
income eﬀects due to the GHH preference assumption. Since the current stock of capital is
ﬁxed, output does not change either. This implies that consumption variability is larger than
output variability in this model. Public consumption reacts in the same way to shocks than
private consumption as a result of separability and the fact that both are assumed to have
the same intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Power switches also aﬀect investment,
and this creates changes in output and labor, but with a lag. Hence, investment is more
volatile than these two variables, as shown in the lemma above. It is worth mentioning at
this point that since we are abstracting from productivity shocks, these implications are
not to be taken as general results regarding relative volatilities but instead as illustrating
18how economic variables react to medium-term political shocks associated with switches in
the ideology of the policymaker.
Lemma 4.4 Government policy and allocations are procyclical
0 < Corr(ˆ x(g), ˆ y) = Corr(ˆ c, ˆ y) < Corr(ˆ n, ˆ y) = 1 and Corr(ˆ Ig, ˆ y) > 0.
Proof See Appendix 8.5.
Private and public consumption are less correlated with output than the labor supply.8
It is not possible to establish theoretically whether private investment is more correlated to
output than consumption is, but this has been veriﬁed in our numerical example (details
upon request). The reason is that investment is proportional to output but it exhibits a
much higher variability.
4.3 The eﬀect of political power
The probability of party B’s re-election increases when its political power ξ rises. If the
incumbent belongs to that group, he is more likely to be succeeded by a candidate of his
own type and has incentives to invest more resources in productive activities (see equation
14). If A was in power instead, a higher value of ξ would decrease this party’s probability of
staying in power. So the short-sightedness would be strengthened, resulting in a propensity
to invest even further away from the ﬁrst best. Despite the decrease in A’s propensity to
invest, long-run capital increases as B’s political power goes up, as shown in Lemma 4.5.




Proof See Appendix 8.6.
Because ˆ y and ˆ n are increasing functions of ˆ Kg, output and the labor supply will also
increase in the long run as ξ increases.
This model also provides implications for the relationship between political stability and
the size of governments. The degree of political stability is closely related to the variable
ξ. Political turnover is highest when ξ = 0, since each party’s probability of winning an
election equals 0.5. As B’s advantage increases, power switches become more infrequent, and
political stability goes up. The size of governments is usually measured as the ratio of total








8Bachman and Bai (2010) also ﬁnd that government consumption is procyclical in a political economy
model, but their channel arises from the correlation between political wealth bias and productivity shocks.
19The long-run average of this variable is just E(e/y) = pAeA + pBeB, and can be shown
to be increasing in ξ following steps similar to those in Appendix 8.6 (proof available upon
request). Hence, the model predicts that countries with larger political advantage—and
low political turnover—should exhibit overall larger governments. Finally, long-run public
consumption as a fraction of output is decreasing in this variable, since E(
x(g)
y ) = 1
2−E(e/y).
More concicely, as the advantage of B increases, a larger percentage of expenditures is
devoted to productive investment and away from public consumption.
The volatility of political and economic variables can be shown to be non-monotonic in
political power ξ.
Proposition 4.3 There exists a unique value ξ∗ such that ∀ξ < ξ∗ we have
∂Var( ^ Kg)
∂ξ > 0
and ∀ξ > ξ∗ we have
∂Var( ^ Kg)
∂ξ < 0.
Proof See Appendix 8.7.
The reason is that there are two opposing forces driving these volatilities. One is given
by the gap between each party’s propensities to save, which increases the volatility of policy
and allocations. The other force is political stability, which reduces it. When ξ = 0, both
parties are completely symmetric. Even though political turnover reaches its maximum
value (with pA = pB = 0.5), the gap is zero (since sA = sB). So there are no ﬂuctuations
in policy or economic variables, and σ2(ξ) = 0, implying Var( ˆ Kg) = 0. As ξ increases, the
marginal propensity to invest of type A falls below the symmetric level, while that of type B
lies above that value. Hence, the gap in the marginal propensities to invest is widened and
volatility rises. For small deviations from symmetry, this eﬀect dominates that of political
stability. Eventually, ξ becomes large enough that even though the gap between sA and
sB is large, political turnover is very infrequent. Since B is in power most of the time,
policy remains stable and volatility goes down. At an extreme, when ξ = 0.5 party B wins
elections with probability one. So there is no variability in policy or allocations.
We can see this graphically in Figure 4 for the set of parameters described in Appendix
8.10.1. As shown in Lemma 4.3, output is more volatile than labor but exhibits less volatility
than public and private consumption. The variance of public investment is much larger than
that of all other variables because the estimated elasticity of public capital is quite small in
this example (θ = 0.039). Therefore, it has been omitted to make the ﬁgure more readable.
This result provides a testable implication of the model. Countries in which parties
are very symmetric (i.e., there is almost no popularity advantage for any of them) will
exhibit frequent turnover but little volatility in policy variables. We should also expect low
variability in countries in which turnover is infrequent. Fluctuations are largest for those
with intermediate levels of political advantage.
5 Empirical support
The objective of this section is to test relevant implications of the model. We will ﬁrst
analyze a cross-section of countries for which we have data on political stability at a point

































Figure 4: Volatility of policy and allocations, measured by the variance of log-variables
in time. We will then construct a measure of political advantage that is closer to the
concept described in the paper for the United States, where we exploit changes in the
relative advantage between the two parties over an extensive period of time.
5.1 Evidence from the cross-section
The economic data are obtained from Kaminsky, Reinhart, and V´ egh (2004), who compiled
a comprehensive cross-country panel for our main variables of interest from the IMF World
Economic Outlook (WEO) and the IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) data sets.
Output y is gross domestic product. Public consumption gc is consolidated general govern-
ment consumption and expenditures e are total consolidated government expenditures. The
series are deﬂated using the GDP deﬂator. Sample lengths for each country are reported
in Table 8.10.2, in Appendix 8.10.2. Political stability is obtained from values assigned
by the Political Risk Services Group’s (PRS) International Country Risk Guide. Follow-
ing Azzimonti (2010) I use the 1980-1990s average for the variable government stability.9
As suggested by the model, more stable economies exhibit larger governments. This can
be seen in Figure 5, which shows that political stability and government expenditures are
positively related (the correlation between them is 0.54). The correlation between political
stability and government consumption, on the other hand, is mildly negative, −0.08, also
in line with the model’s prediction.
9Countries are assigned government stability points based on an assessment of the government’s ability
to carry out its declared programs and its ability to stay in oﬃce using PRS’ proprietary methodology.
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Figure 5: Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP and political stability
5.2 Evidence from the US
One implication of the model is that a country should grow faster when the more popular
party is in power. Alesina and Roubini (1997) provide some evidence of this by computing an
average growth rate of output of 4.24% under a Democratic government and of 2.41% under
a Republican one in the US (for the sample period 1949-1994). In a standard regression,
they found that a change of regime to a Republican (Democratic) administration leads to a
fall (increase) in output growth (even after controlling for diﬀerences in the exchange rate
system, shocks from the rest of the world, etc.). The eﬀects of a change in regime also hold
for a sample of industrial (and bipartisan) countries.
Another prediction is that as political advantage ξ goes up, the share of total expendi-
tures devoted to investment increases (while that of public consumption decreases). The
bars in Figure 6 represent the variable Advt, measuring the average advantage obtained
by the Democrats during all congressional elections to the House of Representatives be-
tween 1929 and 2006. The variable is computed as follows. Let sht(i) = it
Dt+Rt de-
note the share of seats obtained by party i ∈ {R,D} in the House of Representatives
in Congress t ∈ {70nt,...,109th} (that is, covering the period 1929-2006). Following Dier-
meier, Keane and Merlo (2005) the advantage of party D at each period of time is simply
Advt = sht(D)−sht(R). Changes in Advt proxy for movements in ξ, the political advantage
obtained by the Democratic party over the Republican party during this period.
We can see that Democrats experienced an average advantage since the series is positive




































































































Figure 6: Popularity advantage and investment share, 1929-2006
possible to test our prediction by analyzing how changes in popularity aﬀect the share of
public investment.
In order to estimate the investment share as close to the model as possible, I computed





where GNDI stands for real non-defense public investment and GNDC for real non-defense
public consumption. Both series are obtained from the NIPA tables and deﬂated by their
respective deﬂators. Notice that I am not using government revenues or total expenditures,
since the model does not include debt. The investment share is HP-ﬁltered with w=100
(due to its annual frequency), and represented by a line in Figure 6. We can see that
the popularity advantage and the investment share are positively related. A correlation
coeﬃcient of 0.25 provides support for the theory. 10
10I must note that the value of Advt represents the average number of seats at the end of the t
th Congress.
If I were to correlate the investment share with the popularity advantage at mid-Congress, the correlation
would decrease to 0.18.
236 Endogenous political turnover
The previous sections described how the incentives faced by opposing parties facing re-
election uncertainty aﬀected their policy choices. We found that endogenous short-sightedness
arises and parties overspend on public goods and underinvest in productive capital in equi-
librium. Due to an asymmetry in political power, political cycles propagate into the real
economy generating economic cycles. While the channel from politics to economics is well
understood from that analysis, the model is silent on the other direction of causality. Can
economic factors aﬀect political turnover? Moreover, wouldn’t rational politicians choose
policy so as to tilt probabilities in their favor?
In this section, I propose an environment in which this issue can be addressed. In
particular, I endogenize the re-election probabilities by adding a voting stage into the model
following the probabilistic voting literature.
The two groups will alternate in power based on a political institution in which “ideol-
ogy” or other non-economic issues play a role. In particular, I use a “probabilistic-voting”
setup (see Lindbeck and Weibull (1993)) in order to provide micro-foundations for polit-
ical turnover: The probability of being in power next period is going to be endogenously
determined via an electoral process.
A key departure from the traditional probabilistic voting model is that parties do not
have a commitment to platforms. Therefore, announcements made during the political
campaign will not be credible unless they are optimal ex-post (that is, once the party takes
power).
Agents are assumed to diﬀer not only in their preferences over the composition of ex-
penditures but also in another dimension that is orthogonal to economic policy (religious
views, charisma of the politician, etc.). Preferences over this political dimension imply de-
rived preferences over candidates and will take the form of additive iid preference shocks ω.
The instantaneous utility of agent j in region J at a particular point in time is
u(cj,nj) + v(gJ)
      
economic




Each period will be divided into two stages: the taxation stage and the election stage.
At the taxation stage, the incumbent chooses τ,gA,gB, and K′
g knowing the state of
the economy (Kg) and the distribution of political shocks but not their realized values.
Hence, policy is chosen under uncertainty. The probability of winning the election can be
calculated by forecasting how agents vote given diﬀerent realizations of the shock.
After production, consumption, and investment take place, ω′ is realized. At the election
stage, agents vote for the party that gives them higher expected lifetime utility. They need
to forecast how the winner of the election chooses policy. The assumptions of rationality
and perfect foresight imply that agents’ predictions are correct in equilibrium.
24The set of equilibrium functions to be determined in a Markov-perfect equilibrium is
identical to the one in previous sections, with the addition of two new functions: The
probabilities of re-election pi(Kg), which are now endogenous objects.
Election Stage
At this stage, agents must decide which party to vote for. The utility derived from
political factors, ωj, has two components: An individual ideology bias (denoted by φjJ)





where I is an indicator function such that IB = 1 and IA = 0, since ψ and the individual
speciﬁc parameter φjJ measure voter j ’s ideological bias toward the candidate from party
B. I will follow Persson and Tabellini (2000) by assuming that the distribution of φjJ is






, with J = A,B.
These shocks are iid over time and hence are ‘candidate speciﬁc.’ Each period, a given
party presents a candidate and voters form expectations about the candidate’s position on
certain moral, ethnic or religious issues, orthogonal to the provision of public goods. Exam-
ples are attitudes toward crime (gun control or capital punishment), drugs (e.g., whether to
legalize the use of marijuana), immigration policies, pro-life or pro-choice positions, same-
sex marriage, etc. Since φjJ can take positive or negative values, there are members in
each group who are biased toward both candidates. Therefore, individuals belonging to the
same group may vote diﬀerently.
The parameter ψ represents a general bias toward party B at each point in time. It
measures the average relative popularity of candidates from that party relative to those from
party A. While the realization of φjJ is individual-speciﬁc, the value of ψ is the same for all
agents. 11 This is the most essential shock, since by being common to all agents, it is the
one that aﬀects the election outcome. The role of φjJ is to ensure the existence of equilibria
by ruling out ties and is included mostly for technical reasons. The popularity shock is iid












A positive value for η (the expected value of ψ) implies that candidates from party B have
an average popularity advantage over those from the opposition. On the other hand, η = 0
implies that parties are symmetric, in the sense that their candidates are expected to be
equally popular or charismatic. This parameter will be the main driving force behind the
electoral advantage.
11Political scientists refer to this parameter as valence, referring to “issues on which parties or leaders are
diﬀerentiated not by what they advocate but by the degree to which they are linked in the public’s mind
with conditions or goals or symbols of which almost everyone approves or disapproves”(Stokes, 1992).
25Finally, agents are assumed to have perfect information about the candidates, so there
are no informational asymmetries in this model. At the election stage, voters compare their
lifetime utility under the alternative parties. The maximization problem of voter j in group





g) + ψ′ + φjA′}
,
where VA(K′
g) denotes the welfare of this agent if a candidate representing his group wins
the elections, while WA(K′
g) is the value of his utility if the candidate representing group
B is elected. The maximization problem of an agent in group B is analogously deﬁned.
Determination of probabilities
Individual j ∈ A votes for B whenever the shocks are such that
VA(K′
g) < WA(K′
g) + ψ′ + φjA′.
We can identify the swing voter in group A as the voter whose value of φjA′ makes him





Figure 7 illustrates this point (assuming ψ = 0 for simplicity). The swing voter is found
where the two solid lines intersect. All voters in group A with φjA′ > φA(K′
g) also prefer
party B as can be seen in the graph.
The same type of analysis can be performed for agents in group B, to determine the
swing voter in that group.













Under majority voting, party B wins if it can obtain more than half of the electorate;
that is, if πB > 1
2. This occurs whenever its relative popularity is high enough. There exists
a threshold for ψ, denoted by ψ∗(K′
g) such that B wins for any realization ψ > ψ∗(K′
g).

















where ϕ = ϕA + ϕB.
The threshold is given by a weighted sum of the diﬀerences in the utility of the swing
voter under each party. The weights depend on the dispersion in the ideology shocks and
on the amount of supporters that each party has. The higher the heterogeneity within a




















Figure 7: Utility as a function of φjA′
the greater the number of individuals belonging to type J, the stronger the group in the
determination of the probability. Finally, note that the threshold depends on the level of
public capital, though it is not clear in which direction. In principle, this level could increase
or decrease with K′
g.
Since φJ(K′
g) depends on the realized value of ψ, ex-ante the share of votes for party B








= P(ψ′ > ψ∗(K′
g)),











A’s probability of winning the next election is just pA(K′
g) = 1 − pB(K′
g).
Recall that η represents the popularity advantage of candidates from party B over those
from party A. So in principle, B’s probability increases with η.
The current level of consumption in private and public capital does not aﬀect the voting
decision (i.e., no retrospective voting). Voters do not ‘punish’ politicians/parties for their
past behavior but decide instead based on future expected policy choices.
Taxation Stage
27The maximization problem looks exactly like the one presented in section 3, with the
exception that probabilities now depend on the state variable and utility depends on ideo-












where consumption and labor satisfy equations (2) and (3). EB(ω′
j,K′
g) represents the
expected value of tomorrow’s political shock conditional on B winning the next election





















By changing the stock of public capital the incumbent aﬀects not only the economic
dimension but also his probability of winning and the expected value of political shocks.12
The functions VB(Kg) and WB(Kg) satisfy
VB(Kg) = u(cB(Kg),nB(Kg)) + v(gB
B(Kg))+ (19)
β{pB(hB(Kg))VB(hB(Kg)) + pA(hB(Kg))WB(hB(Kg)) + EB(ω′
j;hB(Kg))}
and
WB(Kg) = u(cA(Kg),nA(Kg)) + v(gB
A(Kg)) (20)
β{pB(hA(Kg))VB(hA(Kg)) + pA(hA(Kg))WB(hA(Kg)) + EB(ω′
j;hA(Kg))},
where Υi(Kg) = {gA
i (Kg),gB
i (Kg),hi(Kg)} denotes the equilibrium policy functions
chosen by incumbent type i, and where ci(Kg) = c(Υi(Kg)) and ni(Kg) = n(Υi(Kg)) are
the competitive equilibrium values of consumption and labor under the political equilibrium
policies.
Because the choice of expenditures is static, it is identical to the one under exogenous
political turnover.
The investment decision, on the other hand, now depends on how public investment






12Other papers in the literature usually ignore political shocks because they study two-period models,
once the shock has been realized. Since ! is additive, focusing on net-of-shock welfare is without loss of
















g , and we use the fact that pA = 1 − pB.
Even though parties represent their constituencies and have no derived value of being
in oﬃce, they will try to manipulate the probability of being re-elected (which allows them
to implement the desired policy in the future).
A change in investment today modiﬁes the problem faced by voters, which in turn aﬀects
the probability of being in power next period. A rational incumbent realizes this and thus
takes into account the eﬀect of expanding K′
g on its likelihood of winning. It is reasonable




g) is, in principle, ambiguous.
Under our functional assumptions, we can show that pB1(K′
g) = 0 in a diﬀerentiable
MPE. Intuitively, if candidate B proposes a higher level of investment, it will create a
wedge in the marginal utilites derived from the two candidates. This margin, however,
is independent of the stock of public capital in the economy. The reason is that (the
natural logarithm of) capital appears additively separably from other arguments in all
welfare functions Vi and Wi. Inspection of equation 17 reveals that the threshold value ψ∗
is independent of Kg, and so is the re-election probability (see eq. 18). As a result, the
probabilities of re-election are constant pi(Kg) = pi for i = A,B. Marginal utilities, on the
other hand, are aﬀected by the marginal propensities to invest. Therefore, the probabilities





(1 − si) ˜ AK
 θ
g − G and hi(Kg) = si ˜ AK
 θ
g,
The marginal propensities to invest si and the probabilities of re-election pi are jointly
determined by:
si = ¯ θβ
[
1 + pi
2 − ¯ θβ (1 − pi)
]
. (21)
The probabilities of reelection are pB = 1


















Proof See Appendix 8.8.
Because pi is independent of the stock of capital, the policy rules chosen by the gov-
ernment gi(Kg) and hi(Kg) take exactly the same form as in Proposition 6.1. The main
diﬀerence is that there is now some feedback from policy decisions to political turnover since
the probabilities of winning an election are in turn functions of the propensities to invest.
If sB > sA, forward-looking voters realize that candidates from party B spend relatively
more resources in productive activities than the opposition. This increases B′s chances of
29re-election. On the other hand, higher investment in public capital implies more taxes and
lower consumption than under party A. This force pushes down the likelihood of B being
re-elected. Overall it is not clear whether pA ≶ pB when sB > sA.
In equilibrium, probabilities of re-elections are jointly determined with propensities to
invest. We have a system of four non-linear equations in four unknowns (pA, pB, sA and
sB). From Proposition 6.1 it is clear that if η = 0, then the equilibrium is symmetric with
sA = sB and pA = pB = 1
2. Proposition 6.2 establishes that when η > 0, the equilibrium
will be asymmetric.
Proposition 6.2 Let η > 0. Then party B has a popularity advantage, and as a result, it
invest more and it will be re-elected more often than the opposition




Proof See Appendix 8.9
When η > 0, party B has an advantage over A because positive realizations of the
popularity shock are more likely. This tilts the utility of all voters in B′s favor, which in
turn increases the probability of winning the next election. From the optimality condition
(eq. (11)), this creates incentives to invest more. The opposite occurs with party A.
Given his low chances of being in power next period, the incumbent is inclined toward
unproductive expenditures. In this example, we see a virtuous circle: If individuals believe
that one party has on average ‘better’ candidates (on aspects orthogonal to the management
of economic policy), the strategic eﬀects imply that they will indeed behave ‘better’ in
choosing policy (overspend less on the unproductive region-speciﬁc goods). Despite the
fact that B’s investment decision is closer than A’s decision to the one that would be
undertaken by a planner, B’s saving propensity is lower than the ﬁrst best, s∗. This is a
result of the short-sightedness created by the political uncertainty and the disagreement
over the composition of expenditures.
This result implies that some caution should be taken when inferring unobservable char-
acteristics from observable actions in at least two respects. First, the source of asymmetry
is completely unrelated to how ‘competent’ candidates from diﬀerent parties are. Suppose
that we observe an economy in which the average level of output and investment on in-
frastructure is higher under one of the parties, while spending on unproductive activities
is lower. It would be incorrect to infer that candidates belonging to such a party are more
‘capable’ or ‘eﬃcient’ in dealing with economic issues. This observed outcome could be
the result of equilibrium actions consistent with our model, in which even though parties
have identical investment technologies, political considerations make them choose diﬀerent
strategies. Second, preferences over productive and unproductive spending are completely
symmetric here. In the absence of political advantages, both parties would invest equal
proportions of available resources while spending the same amount on public goods. The
diﬀerence in policy choices in the asymmetric case is a result of strategic considerations
30and does not rely on preference spending biases (i.e., diﬀerences in the weights each group
assigns to the provision of public goods).
Finally, note that only in the symmetric case η = 0 does the threshold level ψ∗ = 0.
As long as party B enjoys an ideological advantage, ψ∗ ̸= 0. Hence, the probability of re-
election cannot be taken as an exogenous object in empirical estimations government policy’s
response to political turnover. Re-election probabilities and spending (and investment) rates
are jointly determined and, taking pi as given, would deliver biased estimates. Measures of
ideological advantage could help us quantify, with the help of the model, the size of such
biases.
7 Concluding Remarks
I presented a model in which disagreements about the composition of spending results in
implementation of myopic policies by the government: Investment in infrastructure is too
low while spending on public goods is too high. Groups with conﬂicting interests try to
gain power in order to implement their preferred ﬁscal plan. Since there is a chance of being
replaced by the opposition, strategic manipulation of the level of investment is optimal.
I considered a case in which ideological biases toward candidates from one of the groups
give them an advantage in the political arena. As a result, the voting equilibrium is asym-
metric and public investment is not only ineﬃciently low but it also ﬂuctuates. The group
with the advantage wins elections more often, becoming less impatient. Therefore, it chooses
a share of investment to GDP closer to the ﬁrst best. Even though both groups have sym-
metric preferences over the size of spending and investment, in equilibrium the group with
the disadvantage tends to spend more and invest less. Since diﬀerent policies are imple-
mented as parties alternate in power, the political cycle is propagated throughout the real
economy. In equilibrium, macroeconomic variables ﬂuctuate even in the absence of economic
shocks. Moreover, consumption, employment and output are distorted despite the fact that
the government has access to lump-sum taxation. Increases in the political advantage in-
duce increases in the share of public investment to total expenditures by the advantaged
party. I show that this is roughly consistent with evidence from the US for the period 1929-
2006. Volatility is non-monotonic in the degree of electoral advantage. Economies with
intermediate values of this variable are expected to exhibit the largest volatility in political
and economic variables.
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8.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1





Denote the rule that solves this functional equation by hB(Kg) ≡ KB. Deﬁne hA(Kg) ≡
KA analogously.
Focus on the problem of party B (and abstract from the subindexes in its value function).
Obtain V1(Kg) by diﬀerentiating equation 8 and simplifying:
V1(Kg) = u1(cB(Kg),nB(Kg))F1(Kg,nB(Kg)). (24)
To ﬁnd W1(Kg) diﬀerentiate equation (9):
W1(Kg) = u1(cA(Kg),nA(Kg))cA1(Kg) + βhA1(Kg){pBV1(KA) + pAW1(KA)}, (25)
where cA1(Kg) = F1(Kg,nA(Kg)) − xg(gA(Kg))gA1(Kg) − hA1(Kg). Notice that alloca-
tions are evaluated given party A’s policy, because we are considering the value function of
a type B agent when his group is out of power.







u1(cB(Kg),nB(Kg)) − pBV1(KB) (26)
In order to replace the equation above in eq. (25) we need the value function to be
evaluated in the investment choice of government A, W1(KA). Assuming that the functions








uc(cB( ˜ Kg),nB( ˜ Kg)) − pBV1(KA) (27)
Replace eq. (27) into eq. (25) and simplify:
W1(Kg) = u1(cA(Kg),nA(Kg))[F1(Kg,nA(Kg)) − xg(gA(Kg))gA1(Kg)] (28)
−hA1(Kg)[u1(cA(Kg),nA(Kg)) − uc(cB( ˜ Kg)),nB( ˜ Kg))].
Update eq.(28) by substituting Kg with K′
g = hB(Kg) and replace in eq.(23). After



























328.2 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Guess a constant investment share hi(Kg) = si ˜ AK
 θ
g. Eq. (10) implies:
gB(Kg) = ˆ cB(Kg) =
1
2
(1 − sB) ˜ AK
 θ
g,
with ˆ cB(Kg) = cB(Kg) −
nB(Kg)1+ϵ






























g = hB(Kg) = sB ˜ AK
 θ




sB sA ˜ AK′ θ
g .
Replacing the guess into the equation above and simplifying,
sB =
β¯ θ(1 + pB)
2 − β¯ θ(1 − pB)
. (30)
8.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Let N = [Kss
gA,Kss
gB] deﬁne the ergodic set. We will prove the proposition in two steps: ﬁrst,
by showing that any sequence starting outside of the set necessarily converges to a point
inside the set; second, by showing that any sequence starting inside N necessarily stays in
N.
Step 1. Let 0 < Kg0 < Kss
gA. Deﬁne the sets Mi = [0,Kss
gi] and Qi = [Kss
gi,∞) ⇒
∀Kg ∈ int(Mi), h′
i(Kg) > 1 and ∀Kg ∈ int(Qi), h′
i(Kg) < 1. Let Kg ∈ MA ∩ MB ≡ M,
then we know that K′
g > hi(Kg) from Lemma 4.1 for i ∈ {A,B}. Hence, if Kg0 ∈ M
the sequence {Kgt}t is increasing. Moreover, ∃T < ∞ such that KgT > Kss
gA. Suppose




gA from Lemma 4.1 and the fact that sB > sA.
Contradiction.
Now let Kg ∈ QA ∩ QB ≡ Q, then we know that K′
g < hi(Kg) from Lemma 4.1 for
i ∈ {A,B}. Hence, if Kg0 ∈ Q the sequence {Kgt}t is decreasing. Moreover, ∃T′ < ∞ such
that KgT′ < Kss
gB. Suppose not. Since Q is bounded below and {Kgt}t is decreasing, then
the series must converge to the lower bound Kss
gB. But hA(Kss
gB) > Kss
gB from Lemma 4.1
and the fact that sB > sA. Contradiction.
Step 2. Let Kgt ∈ N, then there are two possibilities. Either i = A, in which case
Kgt+1 = hA(Kgt) ≥ Kss
gA from Lemma 4.1, so Kgt+1 ∈ N. Alternatively, if i = B, then
Kgt+1 = hB(Kgt) ≤ Kss
gB from Lemma 4.1, so Kgt+1 ∈ N.
338.4 Proof of Lemma 4.3
In parts.
Var(ˆ yt) < Var( ˆ Kgt) : Since ˆ yt = log ˜ A + ¯ θ ˆ Kgt ⇒ Var(ˆ yt) = ¯ θ2Var( ˆ Kgt) < Var( ˆ Kgt).
Var(ˆ nt) < Var(ˆ yt) : Take logarithms to equation (12), then Var(ˆ nt) =
(




Var(ˆ ct) = Var(log(g+G)) : Trivial from ˆ ct = log(0.5 ˜ A)+log(1−st)+¯ θ ˆ Kgt = log(g+G).
Var(ˆ ct) > Var(ˆ yt) : The variance of ˆ ct is
Var(ˆ ct) = Var(log(1 − st)) + ¯ θ2Var( ˆ Kgt) + 2¯ θCov(log(1 − st),logst−1),
from the expression for ˆ ct and the deﬁnitions of ˆ Kgt and ˆ ϵt. Finally, ¯ θ2Var( ˆ Kgt) =
Var(ˆ yt) and Cov(log(1 − st),logst−1) = 0 because political shocks are i.i.d..
8.5 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Let σx denote the standard deviation of variable x. Public investment is proportional to
output, Ig = sy. Taking logs, we can compute
ρ(ˆ Igt, ˆ yt) =






since st and yt are uncorrelated.
Consumption is proportional to output, c = 0.5(1 − s)y. Taking logs,
ρ(ˆ ct, ˆ yt) =






From the deﬁnition of public consumption ρ(ˆ ct, ˆ yt) = ρ(ˆ x(gt), ˆ yt). The correlation of labor
supply with output can be computed in a similar way.
8.6 Proof of Lemma 4.5






































in the right-hand side of















B(1 + pA)2(pB − pA)(1 − pApB) > 0.
8.7 Proof of Proposition 4.3
The proof is based on the properties of σ2 since they determine the shape of Var( ˆ Kg),
deﬁned in condition ii. of Lemma 4.2. We will use the following results.
Lemma 8.1 The variance of ¯ ϵ is non-negative, σ2(ξ) > 0∀ξ ∈ [0,0.5] and has only two
zeroes: σ2 = 0 at ξ = 0 and ξ = 0.5. At these points, its slope satisﬁes
∂σ2(ξ)
∂ξ |ξ=0 = 0 and
∂σ2(ξ)
∂ξ |ξ=0.5 < 0.
Proof The ﬁrst property follows by deﬁnition: σ2 = pApB(ˆ sA − ˆ sB)2 ≥ 0. When ξ = 0,
ˆ sA = ˆ sB ⇒ σ2 = 0. When ξ = 0.5, pA = 0 ⇒ σ2 = 0. Let z = ˆ sA − ˆ sB and note that
pApB = 0.52 − ξ2. Then
∂σ2
∂ξ





∂ξ = 2(1 − ¯ θβ)[(1 + pB)−1(2 − ¯ θpA)−1 + (1 + pA)−1(2 − ¯ θpB)−1]. When ξ = 0,
z = 0 ⇒ ∂σ2
∂ξ |ξ=0 = 0. Since pA = 0 when ξ = 0.5, ∂σ2
∂ξ |ξ=0.5 < 0 follows.
Lemma 8.2 Let Ξ ≡
{




⇒ for any ξ ∈ Ξ, we have
∂2σ2(ξ)
∂2ξ < 0.
Proof The second derivative of equation (31) is
∂2σ2
∂2ψ















= 4(1 − ¯ θβ)
[
1 + ¯ θβpA
(1 + pA)2(2 − ¯ θβpB)2 −
1 + ¯ θβpB
(1 + pB)2(2 − ¯ θβpA)2
]
.




















Deﬁning γi = (1 + pi)(2 − ¯ θβpj) for j ̸= i, replacing the expression for ∂2z
∂2ψ into equation






(1 − ¯ θβ)
(
γ−2
A [2ξ(0.52 − ξ2)(1 + ¯ θβpA) − (0.52 + ξ2)γA]−
γ−2
B [2ξ(0.52 − ξ2)(1 + ¯ θβpB) + (0.52 + ξ2)γB]
)






(1 − ¯ θβ)γ−2




(1 − ¯ θβ)γ−2
A (1 + pA)[2ξ(0.52 − ξ2) − (0.52 + ξ2)(2 − ¯ θβpA)]




(1 − ¯ θβ)γ−2
A (1 + pA)[0.52(−1.5 + ξ) + ξ2(−2 + ¯ θβ/2) − ξ3(2 + ¯ θβ) < 0.
.
Claim 8.1 There exists a unique ξ∗ ∈ Ξ.
Proof Existence by continuity of σ2(ξ) and Lemmas 8.1 and 8.2. The function σ2(ξ) is
continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly positive in the interval (0,0.5) and equal to zero at
ξ = 0 and ξ = 0.5. Hence a point in Ξ must exist.
Uniqueness by contradiction. Suppose ∃ at least one value ˜ ξ ∈ Ξ such that ∂2σ2
∂2ξ ≥ 0,
because the function σ2(ξ) is continuous in ξ and σ2 = 0 at the extremes, ξ = 0.5 and
ξ = 0, as shown in Lemma 8.1. But this contradicts Lemma 8.2, which proved that σ2(ξ)
is strictly concave around any point where the ﬁrst derivative is zero.
8.8 Proof of Proposition 6.1
Guess a constant probability pi(Kg) = pi and a constant investment share hi(Kg) = si ˜ AK
 θ
g.
From Proposition 4.1 we verify the guess for hi(Kg) given a constant pi, where sB is deﬁned
in equation 30.
To verify that pi is constant, note that the value functions satisfy
Vj(Kg) = ¯ νj + νj ln(Kg). (34)
Wj(Kg) = ¯ ωj + ωj ln(Kg), (35)
where
νj =
¯ θ(2 − ¯ θβpi)
1 − ¯ θβ
and ωj =
¯ θ(1 + ¯ θβpj)












(1 − si) ˜ A
)
+ β[pjνj + (1 − pj)ωj]ln(si ˜ A)






(1 − sj) ˜ A
)















pj¯ νj + [pjνj + (1 − pj)ωj]ln(si ˜ A)
]}
.
Replace eq. (34) and eq. (35) into eq. (17) to obtain the expression that determines ψ∗(Kg).
Finally, we verify that probabilities are constant and that governments choose to invest
a proportion of output. Notice that these rules are increasing in capital, diﬀerentiable and
invertible.
368.9 Proof of Proposition 6.2
The proof will be done in two steps.
Step 1: Let η = 0. Then, there exists a symmetric solution.
Substitute eq. (21) into eq. (22), and evaluate at pA(Kg) = 1











2 − ¯ θβpA








2 − ¯ θβ(1 − pA)




At η = 0, pA = 1
2 solves equation (36). Replace this into eq. (21) to obtain sA = sB.
Step 2: Let η > 0. Then, there exists an asymmetric solution
The LHS of equation (36) is increasing in pA. The RHS is also increasing in pA for any









(2 − ¯ θβpA)(2 − pA)
+
1 − pA
(2 − ¯ θβ(1 − pA))(1 + pA)
)
> 0.
From Step 1, there exists a solution at η = 0. Now let η > 0. The LHS remains unchanged
and the RHS shifts to the left. Hence pA < 1
2 and pB > 1
2. Replace these in eq. (21) for
i = {A,B} to see that sA < sB.
8.10 Numerical Appendix
8.10.1 Parameters used in numerical examples
A time period represents a year, so the discount factor is β = 0.95. Following Greenwood,
Hercowitz and Huﬀman (1988) I assume that the elasticity of labor supply ϵ equals 2. The
level of productivity A is normalized to one. There are three non-standard parameters in
this model: The elasticity of public capital θ, the ﬁxed cost of providing public goods G, and
the popularity advantage ξ. I choose the three parameters so that simulated moments at
the political equilibrium match three target moments in the data. The ﬁrst target is mean
non-defense public investment as a proportion of GDP in the US for the period 1929-2006
(GNDI/Y ). The second target is average non-defense public consumption as a proportion
of output, for the same time period (GNDC/Y ). All ﬁgures are obtained from the NIPA
tables. The third target is computed so that the equilibrium advantage of party B, given by
pB −pA in the model, matches the average advantage obtained by the Democrats during all
congressional elections to the House of Representatives between 1929 and 2006 (AD). The
variable is computed as follows. Let sht(i) = it
Dt+Rt denote the share of seats obtained by
party i ∈ {R,D} in the House of Representatives in Congress t ∈ {70nt,...,109th} (that is,
covering the period 1929-2006). Following Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) the advantage
of party D at each period of time is simply Advt = sht(D) − sht(R).
I simulated the political equilibrium for 5000 periods and discarded the ﬁrst 1000 to
eliminate the eﬀects of initial conditions. Table I summarizes the value of the parameters
obtained from the calibration, together with the target variables.
37Variable Parameter Target Target Value
Elasticity of public investment θ = 0.039 Public Investment/Output GNDI/Y = 2.88
Fixed cost of public goods G = 0.063 Public Spending/Output GNDC/Y = 13.84
Popularity advantage ξ = 0.068 Democrat advantage AD = 0.145
The value of θ is in line with empirical estimates and close to the estimate used in Baxter
and King (1993), who set the elasticity of public capital to 0.05. While they use the same
target—public investment as a ratio of output—to calibrate the model, their measure of
investment includes defense expenditures, while mine excludes them. If I were to include
defense expenditures as well, I would obtain a value closer to Baxter and King’s. The
parameter G captures expenditures that have not been modeled (such as defense spending).
To the extent of my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time an attempt to estimate the parameter
ξ has been done in a calibrated political economy model. Therefore, there is no counterpart
in the literature. As we will see in the next section, assuming a constant value for ξ is
clearly a simpliﬁcation, since its value has ﬂuctuated over the time interval. However, using
a stochastic popularity advantage would complicate the solution presented in this paper,
and it is left for an extension.13
13See Battaglini (2010) for en environment in which a party’s advantage changes over time in a symmetric
environment with commitment.
388.10.2 Data Sample
Developed Economies Emerging Economies
Country Period Country Period
Australia 1970-2003 Algeria 1969-2003
Austria 1976-2003 Bangladesh 1969-2003
Canada 1960-2003 Brazil 1980-2003
Finland 1976-2003 Chile 1981-2003
France 1970-2003 China 1981-2003
Germany 1979-2003 Dominican Republic 1980-2003
Ireland 1976-2003 Egypt 1969-1989
Italy 1977-2003 Indonesia 1975-2003
Japan 1960-2003 Iran 1969-2003
Jordan 1963-2003 Korea 1963-2003
Netherlands 1980-2003 Mexico 1969-2003
New Zealand 1980-2003 Morocco 1969-2003
Norway 1976-2003 Pakistan 1963-2003
Portugal 1980-2003 Peru 1969-2003
Spain 1980-2003 Philippines 1969-2003
Switzerland 1983-2003 South Africa 1980-2003
United Kingdom 1960-2003 Uganda 1983-2003
United States 1960-2003 Zimbabwe 1981-2003
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